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Civil Procedure. Department of Corrections v. Tucker, 657 A.2d
546 (R.I. 1995). The decision of an administrative agency had a res
judicata effect on proceedings before another agency as to issues
that were or could have been decided in the original decision.1
In Department of Corrections v. Tucker,2 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the decision of the Personnel Appeal
Board (Board)3 had a res judicata effect on a proceeding pending
with the Commission for Human Rights (Commission).4 The res
judicata effect was on issues that were raised or could have been
raised during the Personnel Appeal Board proceeding.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In Tucker, an African-American male sought employment as a
correctional officer with the Department of Corrections of the State
of Rhode Island, which initially denied him the position. 6 He sub-
sequently brought a charge of discrimination before the Commis-
sion. After negotiation proceedings Tucker was allowed to reapply,
and as a result, was accepted to the training academy.7 After he
successfully completed his training, he began employment as a cor-
rectional officer in the Department of Corrections.8
Within the first six months, Tucker was accused of urinating
in the yard while supervising inmates, watching television in an
1. Res Judicata is the rule that a "final judgment rendered by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and
their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action
involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." Black's Law Dictionary,
1305 (5th ed. 1991). See 18 Charles A. Wright et al, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 4401 (1981).
2. 657 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1995).
3. The Personnel Appeal Board was established to monitor personnel prac-
tices of the state. R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-3-6 (1994). Among its duties is to hear
appeals by state employees who feel they were dismissed due to their race. R.I.
Gen. Laws § 36-4-42 (1995).
4. Tucker, 657 A.2d at 550. The Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights
was established to protect any worker who feels aggrieved. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-
8 (1994). Among the commission's duties is to hear grievances because of racial
discharge. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 (1994).
5. Tucker, 657 A.2d at 550.
6. Id. at 546.
7. Id. at 547.
8. Id.
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inmate's cell and various other prison violations. 9 These alleged
incidents reflected negatively on his probationary reports, which
resulted in his dismissal. Tucker appealed this dismissal to the
Board contending he was the victim of retaliation for the initial
charge of discrimination.10 Tucker also alleged in the appeal that
he was dismissed because of racial discrimination.1 1 On August 2,
1990, the Board denied and dismissed the appeal after a public
hearing. This decision was not appealed by Tucker. 12
However, after the Board's hearing had ended but before the
Board had filed its decision, Tucker filed a complaint with the
Commission alleging racial discrimination, as well as discrimina-
tion due to his initial charge when Tucker was first denied employ-
ment.13  The Board's decision was never brought to the
Commission's attention and the issue of res judicata was never
raised. 14 On June 29, 1992, the Commission issued an order to
reinstate Tucker on the grounds that Tucker's discharge was in
retaliation for Tucker filing the discrimination charge prior to his
employment.1 5
An action to review the decision of the Commission was filed
by Tucker in superior court.16 The Department of Corrections filed
the Board's decision with the superior court.' 7 Though it was
raised, the trial justice declined to consider the issue of res judi-
cata. This decision was based on the fact that the Board's decision
was never presented to the Commission. In addition, the issue of
res judicata was never raised before the commission.' 8 The issue
on appeal was whether the board's decision had res judicata effect
on the proceedings before the Commission.








17. Tucker, 657 A.2d at 548.
18. Id.
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BACKGROUND
The doctrine of res judicata has long been adhered to in Rhode
Island with respect to decisions of courts. 19 Under the doctrine, a
prior decision is deemed binding in a subsequent suit with regard
to the issues that were raised or could have been raised.20 The
decisions of agencies have the same res judicata effect as do the
decisions of courts. 21 This doctrine has been uniformly followed by
state and federal courts. 22 As long as due process is afforded by
the agency's proceedings, its findings are accorded finality. 23 Res
judicata has been held to apply between agencies and federal
courts,2 4 agencies and state courts, 25 among agencies. 2 6
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The supreme court held that the trial justice was incorrect and
that the res judicata issue was properly presented to him. 27 The
court held that the Board had the jurisdiction to decide any type of
wrongful discharge and that its decision had a res judicata ef-
fect.28 The opinion stated that Rhode Island has long adhered to
the principles of res judicata in respect to the decisions of courts
19. Id. at 549. See Rhode Island Student Loan Authority v. NELS, Inc., 600
A.2d 717 (R.I. 1991); Mulholland Const. Co. v. Lee Pare & Assoc., Inc., 576 A.2d
1236 (R.I. 1990); Hebert v. Ventetuolo, 480 A.2d 403 (R.I. 1984).
20. Rhode Island Student Loan Authority v. N.E.L.S., Inc., 600 A.2d 1236 (R.I.
1990); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4449 (1981).
21. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(1) (1980).
22. Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986); McCuin v. Secretary
of Health and Human Serv., 817 F.2d 161, 172 (1st Cir. 1987); Fitandes v. Perry,
537 A.2d 1139, 1140 (Me. 1988).
23. Univ. of Tennessee, 478 U.S. at 799. (The due process requirements of a
fair trial apply to administrative agency hearings). Bourque v. Settore, 589 A.2d
815, 823 (R.I. 1991). (A party in an administrative hearing is "entitled to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."). Id.
24. Univ. of Tennessee, 478 U.S. at 799; S.M.A. Life Assurance Co. v. Sanchez,
777 F.Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1991).
25. Fitandes, 537 A.2d at 1140; Carothers v. Cappozziello, 574 A.2d 1268,
1274 (Conn. 1990).
26. Knox v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 588 A.2d 79, 81 (Pa.
Commw. 1991); Neunzig v. Seaman Unified School Dist., 722 P.2d 569, 574 (Kan.
1986). But see, Capaldo v. Public Utility Hearing Bd., 75 A.2d 302, 305 (R.I. 1950)
(holding that res judicata did not apply when the second hearing was at a much
later date and there was different evidence).
27. Tucker, 657 A.2d at 549.
28. Id. at 549-50. The state is a covered employer. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-
6(2)(A) (1994).
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and that these principles should apply to the decisions of quasi-
judicial administrative agencies.29 In doing so, the court followed
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.30
Hearings before the Board and the Commission offered the
parties the opportunity to present evidence and make arguments
similar to hearings before a court. 31 In addition, there was the op-
portunity for judicial review of the decisions under both agency's
statutes.32 Thus, due process was afforded and res judicata was
applied to the Board's decision.3 3 In Tucker, the Court decided that
the Board's decision was final due to the fact it was not appealed
by Tucker and that the broad area of retaliation included in the
Board's decision was preclusive as to the issues before the
Commission.34
CONCLUSION
In Tucker, the Rhode Island Supreme Court followed the Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments in holding that the decision of an
administrative agency could have a res judicata effect on proceed-
ings before another agency. The case dealt specifically with deci-
sions between agencies, but under the court's reasoning state
courts should also be bound by the doctrine to apply administrative
determinations as long as due process was afforded in the original
proceeding.
Edward M. Corvese
29. Tucker, 657 A.2d at 549.
30. Id. This is a state court but "[flederal res judicata principles have been
heavily influenced by the great advances in the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments. Federal courts and commentators often cite and rarely depart from the
restatement view." Reeder v. Succession of Palmer, 623 So.2d 1268, 1271 (La.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1191 (1994). See Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 83(1).
31. Tucker, 657 A.2d at 549.
32. Id. Parties seeking to appeal the decision of The Personnel Appeals
Board, and having exhausted all administrative options, may obtain judicial re-
view. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15 (1994). The same is true in respect to the Com-
mission on Human Rights. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-28 (1994).
33. Tucker, 657 A.2d at 549-50.
34. Id. at 550.
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Civil Procedure. Ciunci, Inc. v. Logan, 652 A.2d 961 (R.I. 1995).
Under the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, a non-resident
defendant does not have to travel to Rhode Island to be deposed if
undue hardship will result to the defendant.'
In Ciunci, Inc. v. Logan,2 the Rhode Island Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a non-resident defendant, in order to be deposed,
could be ordered to travel to Rhode Island where he was being
sued.3 The court held in Ciunci that the defendant could not be
ordered to make the trip because undue hardship would result.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Ciunci, Inc. v. Logan was an insurance subrogation action re-
sulting from a fire in the defendant's laundromat. 5 Plaintiff lessor
alleged that defendant's negligence resulted in the destruction of
the building.6 Pursuant to Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 26 the trial justice issued an order directing
that the defendant travel to Rhode Island to be deposed. 7 At the
time the suit was filed, however, defendant was a resident of Loui-
1. The opinion does not state the specific rules under examination but Rule
26 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]ny party may
take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral exami-
nation or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence
in the action or for both purposes." R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 26. Further, "[tihe
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in
Rule 45." Id. However, parties to an action only need to be given "reasonable no-
tice" for oral depositions. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 30(a); Carroccio v. DeRobbio, 274
A.2d 424, 426 (R.I. 1971). Failure of a party to appear for the taking of the party's
deposition, after being served with "proper notice," could result in a dismissal of
the action or default judgment. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 37(d); Carroccio, 274 A.2d
at 425. See also Pinkham v. Paul, 91 F.R.D. 613, 614 (D. Me. 1981) (under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is all that is needed to require attendance
of parties to be deposed, there is no need for a subpoena).
2. 652 A.2d 961 (R.I. 1995).
3. Id. at 962.
4. Id. The court held it was an abuse of discretion by the trial judge to order
the defendant to travel from Louisiana to Rhode Island. To do so was contrary to
the "overwhelming authority" of established law. Id.
5. Id. Both parties argued that financial considerations should be ignored.
The Court, however, wanted to adopt a rule to apply to all future parties, including
those without insurance. If they did not, the courts would be inundated with cases
requesting "special consideration." Id.
6. Ciunci, 652 A.2d at 962.
7. Id.
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siana.8 An unrebutted affidavit submitted by defendant estab-
lished that the defendant possessed neither financial savings nor a
steady income. 9 The only issue on appeal to the supreme court was
if an out-of-state defendant could be ordered to travel to Rhode Is-
land to be deposed if the action is brought in a Rhode Island
court. 10
BACKGROUND
Prior to Ciunci, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed the extent of a court's power to order a party to travel ex-
tensively in order to be deposed. However, federal cases which
have involved the same issue have almost uniformly held that a
defendant may not be required to travel to a distant state to be
deposed." These holdings are based upon the reluctance of fed-
eral courts to order a far-off defendant to incur a substantial
amount of inconvenience. 12 However, courts do retain discretion to
8. Id.
9. Id. The affidavit stated that the defendant "was sixty-three years of age,
living on a social security pension and doing some parttime work as a store clerk in
a hardware store" with no appreciable savings and also established that he could
not afford the trip or the related expenses, such as food and lodging. Id.
10. Ciunci, 652 A.2d at 962.
11. Id. citing Thompson v. Sun Oil Co., 523 F.2d 647, 648 (8th Cir. 1975); Grey
v. Continental Marketing Assoc., Inc., 315 F.Supp. 826, 832 (N.D. Ga. 1970);
Twardzik v. Sepauley, 286 F.Supp. 346, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1968); General Leasing Co.
v. Lawrence Photo-Graphic Supply, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 130, 131 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Kurt
M. Jachmann Co. v. Hartley, Cooper & Co., 16 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
12. Thompson, 523 F.2d at 648 (refusing to have a company incur "considera-
ble expense" in transporting its employees from Pennsylvania to Omaha to be de-
posed); Grey, 315 F.Supp. at 832 (holding that the place of deposition is presumed
to be in the defendant's home state unless there are unusual circumstances justify-
ing the "inconvenience" to the defendant); Twardzik, 286 F.Supp. at 350 (holding it
to be "oppressive" to have all the defendants travel over forty miles to be deposed);
General Leasing Co., 84 F.R.D. at 131 (holding plaintiff may only obtain requested
documents at defendant's place of business because of the "burden" of transporting
the great number requested); Kurt M. Jachmann Co., 16 F.R.D. at 565 (refusing to
order defendants to travel from England to New York to be deposed).
Further, it is the plaintiff who chooses the forum in which to litigate. Payton
v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 148 F.R.D. 667, 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993) ("The general rule
is based on the concept that it is the plaintiffs who bring the lawsuit and who
exercise the first choice as to forum."). See also, 8A Charles A. Wright et al., Fed-
eral Practice & Procedure § 2112 (1994). Therefore, the plaintiff "should expect to
appear for any legal proceedings" there. Undraitis v. Luka, 142 F.R.D. 675, 676
(N.D. Ind. 1992). However, this rule is subject to exceptions. Abdullah v. Sheridan
Square Press, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 591 (S.D. N.Y. 1994) (holding, where suit was
brought in New York, depositions would occur in England where plaintiff could not
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order a defendant to travel. 13 In certain circumstances, courts
could order a defendant to travel to be deposed. 14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Because the application of Rule 26 was a question of first im-
pression in Rhode Island, the court looked for guidance from fed-
eral cases which have interpreted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure after which the Rhode Island Rules were fashioned. 15
Since the overwhelming majority of these cases hold that a defend-
ant's deposition is to be taken at the defendant's residence or the
defendant's workplace' 6 the court, noting that Rhode Island does
"not exist in a vacuum", simply applied this line of reasoning to
Rule 26 and ruled that the defendant could not be ordered to travel
to Rhode Island.17
CONCLUSION
The court's reasoning and decision in Ciunci clearly follows es-
tablished federal law. A defendant cannot be required to travel a
great distance to be deposed if it will put the defendant through
hardship.'8 Under the facts of the case, to require a low-income
defendant residing in Louisiana to travel to Rhode Island would
have sued in England and plaintiff could not have left England without losing
asylum).
13. Thompson, 523 F.2d at 648 ("It is well settled that the district court has
great discretion in designating the location of taking a deposition.")
14. Newman v. Checkwrite California, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 659 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(defendants could be ordered to travel 164 miles to be deposed because plaintiffs
had previously rescheduled the depositions to a time more convenient to defend-
ants and defendants did not complain about the location); Undraitis v. Luka, 142
F.R.D. 675 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (defendant waived any right to have deposition be
taken at his residence where the defendant's attorney waited until five weeks
before trial to notify plaintiff that defendant would not appear for the deposition in
district where suit was filed, there was no explanation for the delay, and the plain-
tiffs had been trying to arrange the deposition for over one year).
15. Ciunci, 652 A.2d at 962 (R.I. 1995) ("We have stated many times that
when our Rules of Civil Procedure and our case law are silent on a particular issue,
we will look to the body of law that has addressed the question.")
16. See supra note 12.
17. Ciunci, 652 A.2d at 962. Deference should be given to the "experience and
reasoning" of federal and state court judges who interpret the Federal Rules or
rules patterned after the Federal Rules such as Rhode Island's. Id.
18. Id. (The opinion expressed no view as to the requirements for plaintiffs.
However, it did state it would follow established federal law in the area of deposi-
tions if Rhode Island law is silent on the issue).
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have been too great a burden on the defendant. However, if the
defendant had resided closer or had a different income, it is possi-
ble that a different decision might have resulted. 19
Edward M. Corvese
19. See Thompson, 523 F.2d at 648; 8A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Prac-
tice & Procedure § 2112 (1994) ("The particular facts of each case will determine
the selection of a place for examination.").
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